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THE GOOD AND THE BAD.*

I.

For better or for worse, we have developed the inveterate habit of formulating our experience in terms of personal values. Familiar illustrations of this fact are not wanting, for what are literature and the fine arts, ethics, esthetics, and religion, but the organization of man's "sense of fact" along the lines laid down by his multifold relations with the world of things and of selves? Without a like reference to what is of worth, how shall we be brought to understand history, economics, sociology, or political science?¹ Nor are we confined to the academic disciplines for our examples, for the commercial and social life of to-day has its justification in the fact that it provides a means for the testing of the ideals, that it lends itself as a medium for a larger and more permanent social integration. Now the examination of these examples is serviceable for indicating the close connection there is between our sense of values and those relations of selves which are made explicit in our judgments of worth. If it were within the scope of the present paper, we should have to point out that

* Read October 25, 1906, before the Philosophical Society of the Ohio State University, as the president's address.

¹ Whether or not the same truth lies at the foundations of science and metaphysics is a question in debate which, for that reason, we may leave out of the account. There is, however, a strong presumption in favor of this view.

all value-judgments proceed from centers of personal interests, whatever the other terms are by which such judgments are limited. One term of the value-judgment is always variable, but the other is always constant—the judging consciousness itself. Consequently, the different types of worth are determined by the different kinds of variables within the field of values. Thus, whether the object of valuation be some other self or selves, as it is in some forms of literature, in ethics, sociology and religion, or whether it be things, as it is in economics, commerce, and in part in esthetics, the point of the judgment is to determine the relation between the judging mind on the one side and the given object on the other, when their time and space relations are no longer problematical and may be taken for granted. The worth of a thing or a self may be conditioned upon its being here and now, but it is not determined by that fact. Ultimately, this worth is dependent upon the object's ability to serve as an ideal center for the reconstruction of experience.

What we have suggested as being true of all value-judgments may be made to apply to any of the special fields within which such judgments obtain, by making explicit the variable term of the relation with which these judgments deal. The subject of this paper falls within one of the classes already enumerated as belonging to the general field of appreciation. The good and the bad are to be considered not as the only, but as the main types of *moral* worth.² But before we can state the problems that center in these two forms of ethical relationship, we must define the variable end of the relation to which we give the name moral. To put the matter in a concrete way, our question is whether they are things or selves which receive moral valuation. The answer is, of course, obvious; for if in our final interpretation of the universe we are led to affirm or deny its ethical character, we are persuaded to the view we take

² It is not usual to include the bad along with the good in what we consider moral. There seems no better reason for refusing it a place here than for refusing to classify the ugly together with the beautiful in what we call esthetic.

by the position we hold as to whether the world manifests itself in a characteristically personal way. The ultimate philosophical problem and its solution, however, lie beyond the limits of the present discussion; we refer to the possible opinions that may be maintained to emphasize that the term "moral" carries with it, whenever used, a reference to those relations which are determined by the nature and relations of selves. The moral sphere is essentially that which is constituted, directly or indirectly, by interacting selves. The primary characteristic, therefore, of the moral life, the *menstruum* within which it takes on definite form and feature, is its social quality. Morality, from this point of view, may be defined abstractly as a system of inter-individual relationships. But the relationships existing within any given society depend upon the position the several individuals hold in the social organism taken as a whole. It is obvious, therefore, that those forms of social life are moral which have regard to constitutional limitations. Now, if we lay stress, as it seems we must, upon a system of checks and balances which becomes effective through the organic nature of any society as the determining factor of its moral character, we can see the reason why the ethical field has been limited by some to those forms of social organization in which the human subject is all. The contention of Descartes, for example, that God is above morality, although based upon theoretical grounds, is the view of all who cannot find a common factor between finite and infinite existences. The point is mentioned here not for discussion, but for emphasizing the social nature of all moral life when society is regarded as a self-limiting organism.³

Morality, thus determined, may be studied from either or both of two points of view. In the first, we are concerned with institutional morality. From the psychological standpoint, we may indicate the same set of facts by the term "moral judgment." To combine in a single sentence the separate interests just mentioned, and at the same time to express the relation between them, we might affirm that moral judgments are judg-

³ *Cp.* Aristotle's "Concept of *Entelechy*."

ments of society which take concrete form in an indefinite number of social institutions. By an institution, in this connection, is meant the embodiment in the concrete form of convention—either of law or custom—of the social judgment with respect to what it is permissible for the members of society to do, and what relations they may properly sustain to one another under certain ascertained limitations. Or, to state the same truth another way, the moral judgment is concerned with expressing the constitutional conditions under which it requires each and all who have membership in the group to regulate their lives. The moral judgment, consequently, is, before and above everything else, legislature. In this, it seems to us, Kant was unquestionably right, but his method was defective because the moral will was taken abstractly, apart from its concrete embodiment in the moral institutes of society. The administrative feature of the moral life, on the other hand, is a secondary and derived aspect determined by the requirements of particular cases. In other words, the enforcement of law is a moral function of society, because the law is not a heteronomy but an autonomy, the expression of its own proper being.

The other point of view for the study of morality is that of the several members of society, the standpoint of the subject of moral law. This gives rise to what, in distinction from institutional morality, we may call instrumental morality. Reverting to the terminology of psychology, instead of being concerned with moral judgment, we are now introduced to what are called the moral feelings. The question we confront is not what is right or wrong, good or bad, but what is our reaction to that which has these determinate qualifications. The problem of morality from this standpoint refers to the mechanism of moral action. To put the same statement in the accepted terminology of ethical science, we are stating the question of motive, when motive is some kind or other of feeling. Just as society's chief interest is in the statement of what the right thing is, the subject's chief concern is with the means through which the right thing is to be done. It is in this sense that we mark off the considerations that group themselves around the moral feelings as problems of instrumental morality. What to do and how to

get that done are the two main questions of all practical concerns. They will provide points of attachment for the further discussion of this paper. The question, therefore, to which we may now address ourselves is this: If the moral life broadly considered is found to have the characteristics of both judgment and feeling, to be both institutional and instrumental, in what special sense is this true of those forms of conduct we call good and bad?

II.

In this section we shall direct attention to the good and the bad as types of moral judgment. There are three forms—at any rate three, and there may be more—which these judgments may assume. These we shall discuss in order.

The good and the bad get their specific determinations, in the first place, through the relations they sustain to an ideal. If it is objected to this statement that the relations escape definition because the ideal, through which the qualities are determined, is left without content, it should be replied that this primary requirement has been met already in the conditions under which alone such judgments take place. We remarked above that all moral judgments are social when the constitutional limitations of the *socius* within which they are made have become explicit. Only on these terms can any social fact be moral. Hence when we say that any fact is good or bad through the relation it bears to *an* ideal, we are to be understood to mean *the* ideal which, as a matter of fact, has made the judgment in question possible. The significant question for ethics, or indeed for any other science which develops in ideal ways, never concerns the scope or extent of the ideal, but rather whether any given content is capable of functioning in the interests of a better ordered experience. To speak, therefore, of *the* ideal from the standpoint of the various natural and anthropological sciences, as if to validate their separate judgments were possible only on the supposition that some inclusive and unchanging norm were capable of being stated, is to run counter to the actual way in which our experience in

the several fields of knowledge has grown, and to claim an absoluteness for our finite judgments which falsifies the history of human culture. An ideal we have in every separate social concernment which, in respect to the actually existing situation, is the only ideal. To ask for more than that is to burden ourselves with what could be of no possible use, and to make futile all progress in moral living. It is sufficient, therefore, to recognize that all moral qualities are determined with reference to an ideal which controls the given situation in which conduct takes place. This is the first type of the concrete moral judgment.

Looked at in a slightly different way, the procedure in this case may be said to be analogous to that which is implied in scientific classification. The formula of classification may be expressed thus: "This" is a case of "that." Now, in the present instance, the "this" is always some definite action: going on an errand, studying one's lessons, casting a ballot, or what not. Now each of these is, in one point of view, only a "this." It is, as we say, a "fact." It is there, a positive existence, a something not to be doubted. But to be merely this, to have to pass from one to another of such facts over the chasm that secures to each its separate identity, requires us either to give up thinking, or to find in the emotional irritation generated by a disordered sequence the motives of our cognitive efforts. As we have stated it elsewhere, "Science springs out of the conflict of wishes with facts, and is at bottom the effort to satisfy a vague undifferentiated esthetic sense which shows itself at first under the demand for order and unity. The primitive consciousness of what is esthetically satisfying, and the restraint under which the human spirit lies so long as the objective world presents itself haphazard, gets expression for itself, earliest as well as latest, in the refusal of the human mind to believe that the phenomena of perception *cannot* be reduced from the changing order to a rational system of relations." ⁴ The ground of this belief, which extends beyond the philosophical to the scientific fields of inquiry as well, is the

⁴ "The Concept of Change," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. IX, p. 503.

fact that thought has not to do with a foreign material, but is the instrument which reality employs for its own reconstruction. Every fact, therefore, is an aspect of reality which to be really real must develop meanings through which its individual isolation is overcome in some inclusive whole.⁵ As a question of classification, this signifies that any given fact acquires importance if and when it is an example of some other fact or facts with which it is capable of assimilation. What this other—the “that”—is in an ethical problem, we have already indicated. It is the meaning, the convention, the law or custom, of which the total situation is the finite expression. If the separate, self-identical deed is capable of being regarded as a unique exemplification of the standard life of the group, it is to be judged good; if, on the other hand, it tends to subvert the communal interests, it is to be judged bad. The good is whatever works toward the self-preservation of the whole, it is whatever is capable of being controlled by the interests which are functional in and through the society which determines the particular deed. The bad is whatever works toward social disintegration, it is whatever makes demands upon the social order which, without self-modification, it is unable to meet.

Secondly, good or bad may be predicated of the relation which any social deed is the means of establishing within the social order. In the first case, it is the action itself which receives moral approval or disapproval. In this, it is the redistribution of the social life as a whole which results from the individual piece of conduct. At the close of the last paragraph we referred to self-modification as the characteristic demand of any deed which is called bad. The point of view from which, in this second type of the moral judgment, we regard the moral life, requires us to consider how far modification of the common social ideal may take place without determining the action through which this is brought about to moral disapprobation. This question involves the more general in-

⁵ For the psychological account of the process, *cp.* Stout, “Manual of Psychology,” pp. 84 *f.*

quiry into the nature of the ideal especially with reference to its possibility of development. We may point out that the ideal is the organic law of the moral process through which the *socius* comes to complete self-expression. What, therefore, is required by the idea of growth as characteristic of the moral community, is that every deed should be a unique expression of the common good which the *socius* aims to conserve. As unique, this means that precisely the same thing can never happen again. But, because it is unique, every deed also tends toward the modification of the ideal to which it is assimilated by the moral judgment. Now, as was suggested above, the moral judgment is not concerned with the administration of a law which has its basis outside the sphere of its application, but with the formulation of the law by which, throughout its whole course, definite communities are to be guided and controlled.⁶ The law, therefore, which in every moral judgment receives a new interpretation, cannot be other than the expression of the degree of social integration which the particular group, through its structural differentiations, has at any time attained. What we considered, in the first instance, as a case of classification, we now regard as a growth in the complexity of the structural elements and relations of society as a whole. The problem, consequently, from this point of view reduces itself to a question of fact which only the life history of the community can answer. Growth, that is to say, takes place, if at all, within the limits of variation which are determined by the whole social structure. What these limits of variation are is impossible to state *a priori*. But whatever they are, so long as the deed falls within the specified limits, there is provided the foundation of moral approbation, the degree of approval depending upon

⁶ Theological ethics, as a rule, labors under the disadvantage of the administrative view of the subject; but we do not think this essential to its standpoint. Of course, theological ethics cannot be scientific in the narrower meaning of the term, but must be based upon a definite theistic interpretation of the universe. A bad theology, then, as readily as a bad metaphysics or a bad science, may lead to one-sided and erroneous views in the field of morality. But a good theology is just as possible as a good science or a good philosophy.

whether the upper or lower limits of change are reached. The good, more specifically considered, is that which secures a moderate readjustment of conditions as the determining factor of further moral judgments. The bad, in consequence, must be looked upon as that which carries us beyond either of the extreme limits of variation. When the action falls below, and becomes merely imitative, it is bad; when it falls above, it is so unique that it has lost its points of attachment with the common life, it introduces a relation that is disruptive.

The third type is the personal. This is a late and highly developed form of the moral judgment. It implies the other two. To say "you are good" means not merely that this thing you do exemplifies the moral ideal, nor only that the relations established by means of your action tend to the conservation of the common good, but that whatever you do will both exemplify and conserve the established ends of the moral community. It is definitely a judgment on character. But no judgment on character of the kind we call good is possible which is not at the same time the expression of a confidence which has its roots in the experience of the past. In this type of judgment, consequently, we have the completest exemplification of the social faith (*con-fides*) which guarantees the future. Our future actions are conditioned by the personal type of the social judgment. Or, as we popularly say, we do what is expected of us. We do so, not because we must, but because the ideal has become an established principle of action with us; our life has been completely socialized. We may affirm that it is "the spirit working in the man, the spirit of devotion to the moral ideal and the constant working to realize it, which are the chief distinctions between the good and the bad."⁷ But this spirit and this devotion are themselves the resultants of the life to which they themselves are more and more effectively the instrumentalities. The moral person, in other words, is a product of social evolution in which the ideal no longer exists as an abstract requirement, but assumes more vital relations in a living example. It is the absolutely free life be-

⁷ Ladd, "The Philosophy of Conduct," p. 443.

cause there is no tension between the individual and social aspect of moral existence.⁸ But for the present the implications of the view we are suggesting lie beyond the scope of this paper. We must, therefore, be content to remark that he who does not satisfy the conditions of being morally approved must submit to the other types and methods of judgment until society has—as we significantly say—made up its mind about him. For to be called good or bad is, when thoughtfully done, an irreversible judgment. This is what is expressed, for example, in the proverb, "Give a dog a bad name and hang him." Sometimes it is a long road that leads to social excommunication, sometimes it is only a step. But when, in the judgment of society, a man has lost that feeling for his fellows which is the basis of social commendation, he is *ipso facto* a bad man and comes under social disapprobation and condemnation. He is refused the privileges of the flock because he is not a bird of the same feather.

III.

From the standpoint of the subject of moral action, we are concerned with feeling as instrumental to the moral life. The question whether there are unique moral feelings which serve as a guide to what is right and deter from what is wrong, is only indirectly involved in the problems of this section. We have to ascertain how any one comes to do the things society considers right and wrong, good and bad. Feeling working toward moral ends may be considered in typical ways.

The first case is where a particular action gets done because it is regarded as a means to the satisfaction of a desired end. Now from the standpoint of feeling, we are always at the disadvantage of selecting as means those actions which are only indirectly connected with the end we wish to realize. The reason for this lies not so much in the means we adopt as in the end we aim at. Hence it will be seen that in such examples as fall under this case, we do not have a series of events which are causally connected, but one in which the causal relation is, if

⁸ *Cp.* Jesus: "My Father and I are one."

at all, only implicitly contained. The fact is that the relation between the feeling and the action through which the feeling is to be satisfied is not one that is based upon an analysis of the several factors and the discovery of a common ground, but is due to the practical connections which feeling is alone capable of sustaining. Experience, that is to say, directs the feelings in the choice of means to the ends which are important to them. Now in the moral life it is fundamentally necessary to have, as the support of the individual's efforts in the direction of the larger good, the approbation or good will of society. This is only to state formally what we mean when we insist upon obedience to the laws and customs of the social order as the condition *sine qua non* of making the laws which are the expression of the growing life of the community. Right judgment of what is morally worthy is, according to the best insight of the teachers of morality, secondary to right conduct in the relations of life.⁹ Hence it is that feeling takes precedence of thought in relation to what is right for any one to do. We cannot, therefore, look upon it merely as a remarkable coincidence, but as the result of the psychogenetic development of the moral life, that it is through the feelings that we come most directly into touch with the common life which we share with our fellows in any prescribed social order. The social judgments which exist in the form of institutions become effective through the instrumentality of the feelings in the life of individuals for the getting done of those things which are in harmony with the social ideal. The thing done, however, from the standpoint of the individual does not fall under a class concept, it is not a judgment, but is intended to be the medium of that form of satisfaction which the social approbation mediates.

In the second case the judgmental element, which is barely noticeable in the first, becomes more pronounced, but is yet subordinate to the feelings which are satisfied through the moral approval of what we do. We should include here all

⁹ Cp. Jesus: "Not everyone that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven."

examples of imitation, as well as those actions which, through either experience or judgment, are known to be germane to one or other of the wider classes of actions which have already received the social sanction. At the best, imitation is but a pale shadow of the moral life. And yet the common run of mortals, except by a providential mistake, never gets beyond it! It was this stage of moral development that a teacher of ethics had in mind when he declared to his class that "the good man is not the man who does what I do, but the one who is in right relations to the moral ideal." And yet it must be admitted that imitation, when looked at from the ethical point of view, is a means, and, at an early stage in the moral education of the individual and of the race, the only means available for effecting the "right relation to the moral ideal" which was said to be *par excellence* the test of the goodness of what any one does. For I do what you do, not only because I must do something, but because what you do is fraught with no ill consequences when you do it and, before the development of a critical judgment, there is no reason why it should be otherwise when I do it. When I imitate another for moral reasons, therefore, I do so for the satisfactions that are to be gained, not because I particularly care about the thing itself. The individual interprets actions through their values, and feeling is the sense of the value which things have. When, however, our sense of values fails, or—which is the same thing—our feelings deceive us, some factors of the problem become emphatic which before were either overlooked or taken for granted. Does it, for example, make no difference who does the action which is morally approved? If it does, imitation is no longer a safe guide to life, and when persisted in, may become the source of much that is to be morally reprobated. Why I may not do without censure what you do with impunity is because when I do it it does not belong to the same general class of actions, or does not effect the same relations, as when you do it. The law gets fulfilled in the one instance, it is broken in the other. Hence judgment must be made explicit if, from the standpoint of the subject, the moral feelings are to receive their fullest reward. Judgment thus becomes a

means for the development of the moral life. A larger feeling and active life is possible with the growth in intelligence of the moral subject. Any thoughtful course of action thus becomes good, not because it is rational, but because it secures the social approval in which, for the individual, moral good resides. However rational in itself considered the same action might be, in the absence of the conditions of moral valuation that same thing would be regarded as bad without the approbation of the community which is interested in the relations which the action establishes. We affirm that, from the individual standpoint, satisfaction of the feelings which center in the social judgment are the only guide to moral action, and to the distinctions of good and bad. All moral actions are middle terms between these two sets of factors.

Whether or not we ever reach, as a matter of individual experience, the third form which instrumental morality is capable of assuming will depend, in part, upon the issue of the demand for judgment which, as we have seen, the developing moral experience sooner or later emphasizes. If and so long as the requirements of the particular case are met by assuming the social judgment as our own, or, if and when we come to realize, as a practical affair, that the moral satisfaction we aimed at is to be reached by another course of action than the one first essayed, we have not gone beyond the cases of the second kind. It is only when we persist in our demand for moral approval of the thing we do in face of social disapprobation that the conditions are present for the development of the highest personal or individual morality. But the recognition cannot be given without a redistribution of the factors of the moral ideal and a new insight into the implications of its own nature now, for the first time, made explicit in the individual who has created the new demand. This is the significance, for example, of *Oliver Twist's* request for "more." When the problem is stated in this way, it is no longer a question of the rightness or wrongness of an action, but of the goodness or badness of an individual. If the social consciousness comes to be aware of its own moral ideal in a more thorough and efficient way through the individual, if through the individual society comes

to see and realize its own truest, its most ideal life, the individual has reached a point when *self*-approval is the necessary correlate of the satisfaction which, though deferred, is invariably mediated by this type of social judgment. If, on the other hand, the tension between the individual and society is not resolved, but becomes a breach, we have a situation which, from the social standpoint, is capable of interpretation in only one way, but, from the individual, is significant of several. If no common factor can be found between what the individual does and what society approves, as a matter of social preservation the individual is excommunicated, he is a bad man. He stands for what, with respect to the social order within which he lives, is disruptive. He not only does what is wrong, there is social remedy for that, but he persists in it. Now persistence, in whatever line it may work, is a fact of character. It is, therefore, right to take the particular action as representative, as a sample of what it is reasonably certain we may expect on other occasions. The social judgment, consequently, passes over from the conduct to the individual whose it is. But the conditions under which we have supposed the higher morality of the individual to develop require, even when the social judgment secures our social elimination, that we maintain the correctness of our feelings and the rightness of our action. If and when this is done, there is developed the consciousness of a probity which finds its justification in a wider and more inclusive morality.¹⁰ We act on our sense of values. But our sense of values must receive justification through their connection with a more fundamental ethical existence. I am good then, not because my individuality of action forfeits me the emotional satisfactions which are connected with the social approval, for that is the only test of goodness we have, but because what I do and the feelings I aim to satisfy have their roots in a more essential moral order. Moral actions are moral first because they are typical, and when they are called in ques-

¹⁰ *Cp.* Paul: "With me it is a very small thing that I should be judged of you, or of man's judgment: Yea, I judge not mine own self. *For I know nothing against myself; yet am I not hereby justified: but he that judgeth me is the Lord.*"

tion, they may be vindicated by stating the implied principle.¹¹ When, therefore, the lower and the higher come into conflict there is only one moral course. We must then become intelligent if we are to meet the demands of the best life. We cannot be good apart from a knowledge of what the good is. No less than religion does morality require of us to be able to give a reason for the faith that is in us.

But, finally, we have to consider those cases in which the conflict between feeling and judgment has another termination. We are not always able to defend the things we do. Nor does society easily forgo its own point of view. When neither of these solutions of the moral situation is available, for whatever cause, the only moral course for the individual is to conform his actions to the requirements of the moral life as they have become organized in the conventions of society. Now this may be a permanent or only a temporary resting place in the struggle for the higher life. We may be forced into conformity because we cannot, or because we cannot as yet, justify the thing for which we demand approval. In the former case, it is a matter in which we are in the wrong. When our action is incapable of interpretation through its relation, as means, to the broader social satisfactions, as ends, which are mediated by the social judgment, it loses every vestige of moral significance, and becomes the center of an experience which is wholly individual. Herein it seems to us lies the fallacy of hedonistic theories of ethics; they make the pleasure connected with the performance of the concrete act the end for which the actor strives, instead of considering the action merely as a means to a pleasure which is connected with the action's social value. For us, we find in that action which is done for the sake of its pleasure-giving qualities the essentially bad action. If there is no other reason why anything should be done than the merely psychological fact that it is the source of pleasure to the doer, there is no possibility of bringing it

¹¹ This is the significance of Kant's dictum: That we should so act as to be able to will that the principle of our action should become the basis of a universal legislation.

under a moral denomination. It is merely something which is. It is a brute fact. It happens. Now if one persists in that kind of life, *he* is essentially and radically immoral. But if one attempts to justify himself by ever so small a show of reason, as he may do, for example, by appealing to the unity of consciousness which underlies and gives coherence to the several actions in question, he has made it possible for society to judge him bad, although it is questionable whether he will not himself pass too rapidly beyond the reflective stage to know himself as others know him. There is no basis of moral distinctions where individuality of feeling is all. Good and bad are sounds without meaning.

Our inability to defend our action, we have said, may be due to another cause. The fault may not lie in the conduct, but in our inability to find reasons for it. It may be the better thing, but we cannot as yet assert that it is, because we do not know why it is. It is a case of moral feeling being in advance of the moral judgment. In this situation, we limit ourselves by the recognized social requirements as a temporary expedient, and until the moral situation has become, by the growth in intelligence, more sharply defined. Theoretically, there is no antecedent impossibility to any one being forced to maintain himself in what, with respect to existing moral institutions, is an individualistic position. Sometimes the moral dialectic forces upon some people the *rôle* of an Athanasius against the world. Such a position, however, is defensible only when the concrete case has been thoroughly absorbed by the moral ideal of which it is, *ex hypothesi*, the only example. Herein we find the significance of the great moral characters. They have, as we say, an eye for essentials, and the courage to act in conformity to them. There is no immediate approval possible in such a case. The individual who is forced into this conflict with the moral ideals of his class or age must define the principle of his action, give himself to its exemplification, accept all the consequences, and—the rest is with history.

We may sum up the various points of the discussion in the following statements:

1. Moral action is always social when the social is defined

by means of the constitutive ideas which are the organic law of the moral community.

2. Institutional morality is a study of moral judgments which have become concrete in the form of social conventions, laws or customs.

3. Instrumental morality is a consideration of the moral feelings as a means to those satisfactions which center in social approval.

4. Good and bad as moral judgments assume a variety of forms of which we mentioned three: (1) They indicate that an action does or does not belong to one or other of the general classes of actions which have been approved by the moral judgment; (2) they refer to the relations established by means of any action according as it does or does not require a change in the constitutive ideas of the *socius*; (3) they are predicated of individuals who, by their action, tend to make explicit or to destroy the fundamental principles of the society within which the action takes place.

5. From the standpoint of moral feeling, good and bad may mean three things: (1) that action is regarded by the individual as good or bad which serves or fails as a means to the satisfaction of the desired end; (2) moral feeling conditions the rise of judgment which then becomes instrumental to the doing of those things which are or are not conformable to the moral ideal and therefore of securing the approval or disapproval of the moral community; (3) self-approbation, from this standpoint, is conditioned by the conflict between the judgments of society and the feelings of the individual. This conflict makes possible the highest as well as the lowest types of moral life.

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